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At each stage of the life course, people experience different economic situations. Retired 
people, for example, draw the majority of their incomes from the pension system rather 
than the labour market. Using Survey of Consumer Finances cross-sectional data from 
1973 to 1996, this paper examines Canadian trends in income inequality over the middle 
and later stages of the life course of a synthetic cohort born between 1922 and 1926. 
Three hypotheses regarding changes in the level of income inequality during later life are 
tested:  income is 1) distributed more equally; 2) distributed about the same; or 3) 
distributed less equally, in the retirement years than in the working years. Using Gini 
coefficients, the findings show that income inequality decreases within a cohort as it 
grows old; that is, the Canadian retirement income system smooths out (levels) the 
distribution of income in later life. The observed decrease in inequality corresponds with a 
decrease in income from earnings and an increase in dependency on state benefits. The 
progressive nature of public pension programs in Canada increases the relative income 
share and the average income of the poorest seniors. Moreover, Canada exhibits a more 
equal distribution of income in old age compared to countries with similar old-age welfare 
systems, such as the United States. Any reform toward privatization of the retirement 
income system in Canada will jeopardize the ability of the state to reshape income 





























Most inequality studies have focused on the entire population, making no distinction 
between retired people and people of working age. Brought on by an aging population 
(especially the aging of the “baby boom” generation) and the universal practice of 
retirement, academic interest and research on the economics of aging have grown over the 
last few decades. This paper makes a contribution to the literature on economic well-
being in later life by estimating patterns of income inequality within a cohort (i.e., those 
born between 1922 and 1926) as it ages over the later stages of the life course. 
 
Many of these cohort members worked a significant part of their careers in the first 25 
years after World War II, which saw a rapid increase in real earnings, steady employment, 
and returns on investments (Myles 1996). Most Western, capitalist countries also 
experienced substantial growth in their pension systems during this period (Schulz 1996). 
Most of these cohort members have benefited from, for example, the increased 
accessibility to private and public pension plans and the gradual maturing of private 
retirement savings accounts. 
 
This study tests three prevailing models of income inequality and the later life course 
using Canadian income data. These models make a judgment on the direction of the 
dispersion of income as a cohort grows old. The conclusion will help determine if 
expansion of the old-age welfare system and of the economy in the post-World War II 








According to Canadian Census data, estimates of poverty in old age were relatively 
high in Canada until the early-1980s. Today, the poverty rate for the aged in general is 
relatively low and is almost equal to the level for the rest of the population - about 20% of 
elderly-head families have an income below the poverty line. Current trends in old-age 
poverty reflect above average increases in median real income of seniors. The improved 
economic situation of Canadian seniors is linked to the expansion and maturation of 
Canada's three-tier retirement income system (Oja and Love 1988).   
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The first tier of the pension system is comprised of the Old Age Security (OAS) 
program. Funded by general tax revenues of the federal government, it includes a semi-
universal old age pension
1 and income-tested income supplements (i.e., Guaranteed 
Income Supplement - GIS - and Spouse's Allowance - SPA) for old age pensioners and 
their spouses. The second level of the retirement income system consists of the Canada 
and Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP). This government-regulated program is entirely 
funded by employer and employee contributions and provides basic pension income for 
those who were in the work force. While OAS benefits are not tied to employment and 
earnings histories, C/QPP benefits are solely determined by contribution amounts made to 
the plan during the working years. The third tier of the retirement income system consists 
of private (employer-sponsored) pension plans and personal retirement savings plans. 
These plans are privately administered but publicly subsidized (i.e., contributions to these 
plans are tax deductible). 
 
While the Canadian aged are better off now than in the past, they are not a 
homogeneous group. If the financial condition of sub-groups of older people is examined, 
it is evident that particular groups of seniors (e.g., unattached elderly women, Native 
peoples, persons with limited education) have a disproportionate percentage of individuals 
with meager economic resources. The improved general income picture yet high rates of 
poverty for certain Canadian seniors suggest two things. First, many seniors have been left 
behind by the post-World War II economic boom and improvements to the pension 
system. Increases in median real income are essentially the result of the improved incomes 








It remains unclear in the Canadian research literature whether the overall level of 
income inequality within a cohort over the later stages of the life course increases, remains 
the same, or decreases. This is an important question because there is a fundamental 
change in sources of income from the labour market to the retirement income system in 
old age (i.e., at age 65). In other words, an analysis of intracohort income inequality 
during old age provides insight into the equalizing impact of pension systems in Canada, 
notably public transfers and programs.  
 
RISING TIDE/TRANSFER REDISTRIBUTION MODEL 
 
Varying assumptions about the effect of public pension policy on the distribution of 
income in later life have led to three models of economic well-being and the later life 
course. The first model is the "rising tide" (Crystal and Shea 1990a) or transfer  
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redistribution (Pampel and Hardy 1994a) model. According to this model, a primary goal 
of public welfare systems is to redistribute income from the rich to the poor (Myles and 
Quadagno 1994). Public pension benefits are therefore more equally distributed than 
income generated from the labour market. The unskewed distribution of public benefits 
results from the political process and the bargaining power of labour inside the state (e.g., 
Myles 1989; Pampel and Hardy 1994a). Since each person carries an equal weight in the 
democratic process, the state, unlike like the labour market, is compelled to ensure the 
well-being of all citizens. In the end, a progressive public pension system, which becomes 
a key source of income for seniors, reduces the overall level of income inequality in old 
age relative to middle age.  
 
Using data from the 1976 Survey of Consumer Finances, Myles (1981) finds some 
support for this model in Canada. He observes that public policy (measured in terms of 
public pensions and taxes) has a leveling or equalizing effect on the rate of absolute and 
relative income inequality across socio-economic groups in old age. Looking at the 
income returns of education in old age, Myles finds that the Canadian tax system is largely 
responsible for the reduction of the absolute level of income inequality (i.e., differences in 
the distribution of income measured in dollars). While public policy on average reduces 
absolute income differences across educational groups by 20%, most of this change is the 
result of the tax system. On the other hand, relative income inequality (i.e., differences in 
the income distribution measured in relative position) is primarily reduced by the transfer 
system.  
 
A longitudinal analysis of the incomes of 11,000 people born between 1906 and 1911 
over a 10-year period (1969 to 1979) by Hurd and Shoven (1985) shows support for the 
rising tide model in the U.S. Using information provided by Hurd and Shoven, the 
calculated average total household income (in 1968 dollars) of sample members in the 
lowest 10% of the income distribution increases from $1,362 in 1968 (when most 
members were still employed) to $2,179 in 1978 (when most had left the work force). 
Conversely, the average household income of all sample members fell from $8,246 to 
$6,768 over this period, and the wealthiest people (i.e., those in the top 10% of the 
income distribution) experienced an even larger decline - from $15,689 in 1968 to 
$12,248 in 1978. While these statistics do not measure overall inequality in a distribution, 
they do give some credence to the rising tide model that the welfare system helps to 
reduce income inequality during the retirement years. 
 
The effectiveness of the old-age public welfare state in reducing income inequality has 
been seriously questioned. While most systems of taxation and transfer payments are 
progressive, other scholars argue that their equalizing effects are diminished by the 
unequal distribution of income from private sources (e.g., private pensions, investments, 
and savings). However, the degree to which the leveling effects of public policy is offset 
by private sources of income is also subject to debate, and help distinguish the following 
two perspectives.  
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STATUS MAINTENANCE MODEL 
 
The second model of income inequality and the later life course - status maintenance 
(Henretta and Campbell 1976) - holds that policies and programs in "liberal," market-
oriented welfare states (i.e., welfare systems that provide income-tested assistance, some 
universal benefits, and/or modest social insurance benefits), such as Canada, the U.S., and 
the U.K., play an insignificant role in reshaping old-age income inequality (Esping-
Andersen 1990). This is because the public pension system in these countries is comprised 
of programs that act both to equalize incomes (e.g., GIS in Canada and Supplemental 
Security Income in the U.S.) and to reinforce pre-retirement inequalities by favoring those 
who made higher contributions over the life course (e.g., C/QPP and Social Security). 
The fact that liberal social policies are primarily concerned with maintaining, not 
changing, economic status and inequality in retirement is also reflected in these 
governments' support for private sector solutions for income security and maintenance in 
old-age, the subsidization of the private welfare system through tax incentives, and 
meager public pension benefits (Esping-Andersen 1990).   
 
Some support for this model is found in research on income differences between socio-
economic groups before and after retirement by Henretta and Campbell (1976). Their 
findings show that the determinants of income prior to retirement remain strong indicators 
of income in retirement. Looking at a synthetic cohort of men aged 55 to 64 in 1962 and 
aged 66 to 77 over a decade later, they find that the variables (e.g., occupational status) 
with the biggest effects on pre-retirement income have almost identical influences on 
income in retirement. Pampel and Hardy (1994b) repeat similar findings in a longitudinal 
study.  
 
CUMULATIVE DIS/ADVANTAGE/STATUS DIVERGENCE MODEL 
 
The third model of income inequality and the later life course is the cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage (Crystal and Shea 1990a) or status divergence (Pampel and 
Hardy 1994a) model. This model suggests that despite the redistributive goal of public 
pension benefits, the existing retirement income system produces more income inequality 
than the labour market because economic advantages and disadvantages cumulate over 
the life course. Individuals with high status attainment as a result of high parental socio-
economic status and/or human capital investment are, on average, financially well off 
during the working and retirement years. This is because higher education translates into a 
good job - one that offers relatively high wages with career prospects, favorable working 
conditions, opportunities to acquire on-the-job skills, employment stability, and fringe 
benefits - and health. In turn, these individuals are less likely to suffer illness or 
occupational injury or to be forced to retire due to poor health or unemployment, and are 
more likely to have above average lifetime income and accumulate savings, investments, 
pension credits, and other assets (Crystal and Shea 1990a).   
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The opposite is true for those with status background disadvantages  - individuals with 
fewer early economic opportunities and resources. They are more likely to be forced into 
retirement or early retirement by poor working conditions and health, redundancy, 
unemployment, and job loss (Tindale 1991), and experience a loss of labour income 
coupled with little or no resources to replace this income (Pampel and Hardy 1994b). 
They tend to rely almost exclusively on government benefits that operate at the margins 
(O'Rand 1996). 
 
The accumulation of economic resources for some individuals, and the economic perils 
that old age brings for others, implies two problems. One, there will be a grossly unequal 
distribution of retirement income from private sources. Given that public pensions in 
liberal, market-oriented welfare state regimes are designed to provide seniors with only a 
limited portion of pre-retirement earnings, it will also outweigh the redistributive function 
of government transfers. Two, the overall level of income inequality within a cohort will 
expand with advancing age. 
 
This model has found more empirical support (especially in the U.S.) than either the 
rising tide/transfer redistribution or status maintenance models. Using data from the U.S. 
National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men, Crystal and Waehrer (1996) and Pampel and 
Hardy (1994a) report that the level of relative income inequality within a cohort increases 
over the later stages of the life course. Multiple cross-sectional analyses of income 
inequality rates across age groups in the U.S. also lend support to the cumulative 
advantage/disadvantage model (e.g., Crystal 1996; Crystal and Shea 1990a; Hedstrom and 
Ringen 1990). 
 
This paper determines which of the three models of income inequality and the life 
course best fits the Canadian situation. The methodological choices made in this study, 








The aim of this study is to compare the distribution of income before and after the 
transition to retirement.
2 It is important to detail all aspects of the choices made here 
because studies of income inequality are understandable only in reference to the methods 
used. Two researchers using the same data set and studying the same problem could 
produce different results due to differences in methodological approach. The 
methodological choices made here are based on the appropriateness, comparability, and 
validity of the measures. The methodological topics discussed below are grouped into  
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four categories: data sources, operationalization of income, data adjustments, and 
inequality estimation techniques. 
 
DATA SOURCES  
 
The data used here come mainly from the Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF). The SCF is produced annually by Statistics Canada. The SCF contains a 
comprehensive series of economic indicators, with each file providing data on a 
representative sample of approximately 25,000 households. In total, the SCF represents 
more than 97.5% of the Canadian population (Statistics Canada 1997).
3  
 
The study of income dynamics ideally requires long-term, longitudinal data; however, 
such data are not generally available in Canada. This shortfall is overcome by deriving 
estimates of income inequality over the life course from a series of cross-sectional data. 
Persons born between 1922 and 1926 are selected from about every fifth cross-sectional 
file, starting in 1973, of the SCF.
4 To control for the effects of the business/economic 
cycle, SCF data are selected for years in which labour market conditions (measured by 
national unemployment rates) are similar. Thus, data from the 1973, 1981, 1986, 1991, 
and 1996 SCF are used.
5 The degree of income inequality within this "synthetic" cohort is 
calculated from each file. In the end, the level and path of inequality for this birth cohort is 
estimated over a 23-year span (i.e., 1973 to 1996).
6  
 
While the overall goal of this paper is to examine the dynamics of income over the later 
life course of a Canadian cohort, levels of old-age income inequality across nations are 
also compared.
7 The analysis of income inequality across countries with different 
retirement income systems provides a better understanding of the redistributional impact 
of a country's pension policies (Crystal 1996). The equalizing effect of pension policy in 
selected countries is tested with Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data, which are a 
collection of income data that have been made comparable by aggregating/disaggregating 
income components from specific countries into universally consistent income 
classifications (e.g., private pensions, means-tested cash benefits) (for a more complete 
description of the LIS, see Smeeding, O'Higgins, and Rainwater 1990). 
 
MEASURING INCOME  
 
While the SCF provides estimates of income distribution every year, it also covers 
wealth. A wealth survey, however, has not been conducted since 1984. Given the 
inconsistency of wealth data, income is used as the sole measure of economic well-being 
over the life course.
8 Since personal income can underestimate the economic well-being of 
individuals who depend on the resources of other family members, this study uses a 
broader income measure - total annual money income received from all family members 
from all sources, minus direct taxes (i.e., income tax and social insurance contributions).
9 
Families are grouped according to the age of the family head. Hence, this study uses the  
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family head as the unit of analysis and family income as the income measure.
10  
 
DATA ADJUSTMENTS     
 
This section describes the adjustments made to the measure of income used in this 
study. Minor modifications are made to make the data more robust and indicative of the 
actual income of people. Adjustments for family size and for underreporting of some 
income components in survey data are discussed below. 
 
When using family income as the income measure, adjustments must be made for 
family size (Crystal and Shea 1990b). Using unadjusted family income underestimates the 
aged's income because non-aged families typically share their income with more people. 
The literature offers various equivalence scales for such adjustments (see Atkinson, 
Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995), and there is no general agreement as to the best 
equivalence scale (Crystal and Shea 1990b). A common method in controlling for family 
size is to produce family income on a per capita basis (i.e., total family income divided by 
the number of persons in the family). Since this approach does not take into account the 
"economies of scale" in families, it underestimates family resources. This study therefore 
assumes that family income adjusted for family size, I, equals total family  
income, f, and family size, s, in this manner: 
 
where e, the equivalence elasticity, is .5.  
 
Some studies adopt an equivalence elasticity equal to the adjustments used by 
government agencies in determining official poverty lines, while other equivalence scale 
values are based on different knowledge (e.g., consumer expenditure studies) (Atkinson et 
al. 1995). Total family income divided by family size raised to the power of .5 (which is 
equal to the square root of family size) offers an intermediate between using per capita 
income and using no adjustment for family size. Consistent with many income distribution 
studies (e.g., Atkinson et al. 1995; Myles and Quadagno 1994; Rainwater, Rein, and 
Schwartz 1986), this paper uses this equivalence scale. Hence, family income is divided 
by: 1.0 for a one-person family, 1.41 for a two-person family, 1.73 for a three-person 
family, and so on. In other words, a family of two, for example, needs 1.41 times the 
income of a one-person family to be equally well off.  
 
The second adjustment made to the data is for the inaccurate reporting (intentionally or 
unintentionally) of income (Crystal and Shea 1990b). By comparing SCF income 
estimates to actual figures from national accounts, Statistics Canada (1997) points out 
that survey estimates of earnings, most government transfers (including public pension 
income), and private pension income are reported accurately; however, SCF estimates of 






The SCF-National Accounts reconciliation for the years analyzed in this study show 
that the SCF estimates of average income from investments are underreported by: 33% in 
1973, 33% in 1981, 40% in 1986, 50% in 1991, and 45% in 1996. On average, the SCF 
estimates of income from social assistance are underreported by about 35%. Accordingly, 
income from investments and social assistance is adjusted for the degree of underreporting 
for both of these sources. This is especially important because investments are an 
important source of income for many persons in later life.  
 
A related problem in survey research is missing data. Missing values can affect data 
analysis in many negative ways. To compensate for the non-reporting of some or all 
income details in the SCF, Statistics Canada uses an imputation procedure (Statistics 
Canada 1992).
11 That is, income information for "income non-respondents" is imputed 




STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES: EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF INEQUALITY 
 
One of the most commonly used and recognized measures of inequality - the Gini 
coefficient (G) - is used here. Generally speaking, G satisfies the "desirable" conditions of 
a robust measure of inequality (Love and Wolfson 1976). One of the most important 
conditions is mean or scale independence. This condition is met if changing the units of 
measurement of income (e.g., from dollars to 25 cent pieces) leaves the inequality 
measure unchanged. In other words, the measure is unaffected by increasing all incomes 
proportionately. A scale free index (i.e., independent of the units of measurement of 
income) is a relative measure of inequality that can be used to make comparisons across 
distributions. 
 
Another condition that differentiates measures is the condition of transfer. This 
condition is satisfied if a measure of inequality is reduced when a transfer of income is 
made from a richer to poorer person or vice-versa. While G meets this condition, it is 
more sensitive to changes that occur in the middle of the distribution. Hence, the 
coefficient of variation (CV), which is more sensitive to changes among the very rich or 
the very poor, is also computed.
13 A comparison of both measures offers some 
compensation for this sensitivity bias in each of these measures; hence, providing more 
valid findings. 
 
The G and CV are very popular measures of inequality due to their intuitive ease of 
interpretation. They are both summary devices that provide a single number measure of 
relative inequality. G ranges from zero to one. If everyone had the same income, G would 
be zero; conversely, if all incomes were held by just one individual, the coefficient would 
be almost one.
14 For that reason, the higher the G, the more inequality that exists. The  
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mathematical expression for G presented by Jenkins (1991) is: 
 
where families are ranked by income in descending order, yi is the income of the ith 
family, m is the mean income, and n is the number of cases.  
 
The CV is the square root of the variance divided by the mean. A CV of zero indicates 
no inequality within a distribution; however, its upper limit, in theory, is infinite. The 
upper limit of the CV can be confined to a maximum of one by a basic conversion: 
CV/(CV+1). Transformed CVs are used here in order to make more direct comparisons 






INCOME INEQUALITY IN MIDDLE AND OLD AGE 
 
The extent of inequality in family income for all Canadian family heads born between 
1922 and 1926 is compared across time in Table 1.
15 As reflected in the third row of Gini 
coefficients, income inequality steadily increases from ages 47 to 64 (1973 to 1986).  
However, the most dramatic increase occurs between the ages of 55-59 and 60-64; the 
Gini ratio rises from .318 in 1981 to .360 in 1986. This is more than a 10% increase over 
this period.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
This rise in the level of income inequality can be explained by the fact that while many 
older persons around this age remain in the work force, a substantial percentage of them 
either voluntarily or involuntarily exit the labour force or reduce the numbers of hours 
they spend working. While only one-fifth (20.9%) of all family heads aged 55-59 did not 
work (either part-time or full-time) in 1981, almost one-half (48.1%) of heads aged 60-64 
was completely removed from the labour force in 1986. Since most federal and provincial 
income programs and other state benefits are not available until age 65, the incomes of 
persons under 65 years of age with little or no employment earnings can be significantly 
reduced, increasing the overall rate of income inequality.  
 
The second trend observed in Table 1 is the steady decline in the level of income 
inequality in old age.
16 This pattern of inequality is compatible with the rising tide/transfer 
redistribution model. In 1991, when cohort family heads reach the ages of 65-69, 
inequality is dramatically lower compared to five years earlier (i.e., .360 in 1986 vs. .305 
in 1991) - this is a decrease of over 15%. The level of inequality further falls to .286 in 
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1996 (ages 70-74). The decline in the rate of income inequality during old age is related to 
factors such as a decrease in the chance of being employed, savings and investment 
depletion, and, consequently, an increase in reliance on state benefits with advancing age, 




SEPARATING AGE, COHORT, AND PERIOD EFFECTS 
 
An important question is to what extent is the observed pattern in income inequality 
over the life course the result of age, cohort, and period effects. While it is possible to 
separate age and cohort effects with the synthetic-cohort method used here, it is more 
difficult to separate age from period/time of measurement effects. Period effects can 
influence the economic well-being of a cohort at two points in time since one period may 
be defined by, for example, high economic growth or low unemployment while another is 
marked by economic recession or high unemployment. To control for the effects of the 
business cycle, data are selected from years where labour market conditions are similar 
(measured by national unemployment rates). However, other period effects are also likely 
to influence economic well-being (e.g., increased spending on social programs, changes in 
C/QPP and private pension programs). Changes such as these have likely contributed to 
some extent to the trends observed in Table 1, making them unique to cohort members 
born between 1922 and 1926.  
 
To isolate year of measurement (i.e., period) effects from age effects (at least any 
period effects that occurred between 1973 and 1996), levels of income inequality before 
and after retirement for three cohorts are shown in Table 2. This table displays a matrix 
consisting of Gini coefficients for three five-year birth cohorts (i.e., family heads born 
between 1917-1921, 1922-1926, and 1927-1931) at various points in time and ages.  
 
Table 2 can be read in different ways to determine the impact of period effects. First, 
by reading the table diagonally, rates of income inequality for the younger, middle, and 
older five-year cohorts at different points in time, but the same age, can be compared. It is 
observed that the magnitude of inequality at ages just prior to retirement (i.e., 60-64) is 
almost the same across the three observation years. A comparison of Gini coefficients for 
the three cohorts in the ages immediately after retirement, however, reveals somewhat 
more difference. At ages 65-69, the Gini ratio is .282 for the younger cohort, but .316 for 
the older cohort. The Gini coefficient for the middle cohort falls between these two values 
(i.e., .305). The difference in the level of income inequality for the younger and older 
cohorts in old age makes sense since the Canadian public pension system, which is a 
primary source of income for lower and middle class seniors, changed between 1986 and 
1996 (e.g., the maturation of the C/QPP and the OAS claw-back). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Second, by reading down Table 2 cross-sectional age differences are obtained. In 1991,  
  13
the rate of income inequality decreases from .364 among those of pre-retirement age (60-
64) to .305 among those of post-retirement age (65-69). A similar pre/post-retirement 
pattern is also observed in 1986. Third, Table 2 can be read across. The level of income 
inequality drops significantly as family heads from the youngest cohort reach retirement: 
between 1991 and 1996 the rate of inequality falls from .364 to .282. However, the rate 
of inequality is more stable for the oldest and middle cohorts between these years. 
Further, all cohorts experience a substantial drop in the degree of inequality as they reach 
old age at different points in time (i.e., 1986, 1991, and 1996).  
 
In conclusion, the impact of period effects between 1973 and 1996 appears to be small, 
since the level of income inequality: remains fairly constant at different points in time for 
the same age groups (i.e., Table 2 read diagonally); decreases in old age at different points 
in time (i.e., Table 2 read down); and follows a similar pattern with age for different birth 
cohorts (i.e., Table 2 read across). Changes in the level of income inequality for cohorts 
entering old age prior to the 1980s, however, are likely much different. This is because the 
three cohorts observed in Table 2 have all benefited from the growth in public and private 
pension systems. 
 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION WITH QUINTILES 
 
The degree of inequality in an income distribution has been expressed as a single, 
numeric value; however, income inequality can also be depicted by an income quintile 
distribution. By comparing income quintiles for different years, it is possible to see how 
shares of income have changed between income groups.  
 
The most obvious finding in Table 3 is the small proportion of total income in the 
bottom quintile (i.e., those with the lowest 20% of incomes) –  for example, their share of 
all incomes is just 6.4% at ages 60 to 64. By the time cohort family heads reach retirement 
age, however, the bottom quintile's share of income increases to 9.7% at ages 65 to 69 
and 10.3% at ages 70 to 74. The relative situation of the second quintile also improves in 
old age (from 11.5% at ages 60-64 to 13.1% at ages 70-74). These increases in income 
shares for the bottom two quintiles come mainly at the expense of the top quintile (i.e., 
those with the highest 20% of incomes), who in 1996 possesses 39.0% of all incomes 
compared to 42.2% in 1986. These numbers suggest that old-age public pension policy in 
Canada does redistribute income to the poorest families.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
AVERAGE INCOME AND THE LATER LIFE COURSE  
 
Since income quintiles provide a relative measure of inequality, an increase in relative 
income shares of those in the bottom quintiles does not necessarily mean that their 
absolute incomes have improved. Table 4 shows income in absolute terms (i.e., median  
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family income in 1996 dollars) for each quintile from 1973 to 1996.  
 
The most notable trend in this table is the growth of median real income for those in 
the bottom quintile of the income distribution in old age. Between 1986 and 1991, median 
adjusted income of families in this quintile increases from $8,900 to $12,363 (or by 
40%). This improvement reflects the fact that public pension benefits in Canada are not 
strongly tied to employment history. Hence, the public pension system is particularly 
generous to those at or near the bottom of the income distribution. Further, Canada has 
relatively high minimum public pension benefit levels; thus, Canadians in the lowest 
quintile just prior to retirement tend to experience no drop in their income upon 
retirement.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
On the other hand, the median adjusted family income of the middle and fourth income 
quintiles decreases from $21,485 and $30,044 at ages 60-64, respectively, to $19,479 and 
$26,608 at ages 65-69. While old age reduces the standard of living of middle- and upper 
middle-income families, it is not significant - median income is reduced by only about 10% 
for both quintiles. This would suggest that the retirement income system is able to 
maintain, on average, a "reasonable" relationship between income before and after 
retirement for middle class Canadian families. While those in the top income quintile have 
considerably higher adjusted incomes both before and after retirement, there is a similar 
reduction in their standard of living in old age; median income decreases from $46,373 in 
1986 to $41,834 in 1991 (or by about 10%).  
 
SOURCES OF INCOME IN LATER LIFE  
 
The data here show strong support for the hypothesis that inequality in income narrows 
in old age. The rising tide/transfer redistribution model also assumes that this decline is 
the result of increased reliance on state benefits, which are largely redistributive, among 
seniors. This assumption is tested by analyzing the breakdown of public and private 
sources of family income in old age by income quintiles.  
 
Table 5 shows the percentage of income that the bottom and top income quintiles (and 
all cases combined) receive from OAS/GIS, C/QPP, investments, private pensions, 
earnings, and other sources when cohort family heads are aged 70-74 (i.e., in 1996). 
These data support the assumption that seniors rely heavily on income from government 
transfer payments. OAS/GIS benefits alone constitute over one-quarter (25.2%) of family 
income. Further, there is a weighty reliance on government benefits for those in the 
bottom income quintile; public sources (OAS/GIS and C/QPP) form almost 90% of their 
income.  
 
Table 5 about here  
  15
 
Public sources of income make up a large percentage of seniors' overall income 
because they are less discriminating (i.e., based less on pre-retirement socio-economic 
status) than private ones. In fact, while the top income quintile has a mean adjusted 
income (before taxes) of $56,780 compared to a mean adjusted income of only $12,288 
for the bottom income quintile in 1996, the latter group receives $160 for each $100 
received by the former group from OAS/GIS (i.e., $8,671/$5,542). The income-testing 
component built into the OAS/GIS program produces this equalizing effect. In terms of 
the C/QPP, the bottom quintile receives about $40 for every $100 received by the top 
quintile. Private sources of retirement income are distributed much less equally. The 
bottom quintile receives only a few dollars for every one hundred dollars received by the 
top quintile from investments, private pensions, and earnings. 
 
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC PENSION POLICIES: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
The results in the previous sections show that the distribution of income becomes more 
equal in old age relative to the years just before age 65. The primary reason for this is that 
public pension benefits in Canada become more important than labour market income, and 
the former are more equally distributed than the latter. This section looks at how 
government policy in Canada fairs in reducing old-age income inequality compared to 
other industrialized, Western nations (i.e., U.S., U.K., and Sweden).  
 
Table 6 shows the distribution of net (post-tax/post-transfer) family income to quintiles 
of family heads aged 65+, along with the Gini coefficient for each distribution.
19 The 
differences across countries exist primarily in the top and bottom income quintiles. 
Sweden has the largest bottom quintile - 12.3% - but just slightly higher than the bottom 
quintile share in Canada (11.7%). The second and third bottom quintiles in Sweden, 
however, receive a relatively higher income share than they do in Canada. As a result, 
Sweden has the lowest income share in the top quintile. This more equal distribution of 
income is reflected in Sweden's moderately lower Gini coefficient (.191) compared to 
Canada (.240). By contrast, the U.S. has the lowest share in the bottom quintile compared 
to the other countries, and the highest percentage in the top quintile. This is reflected in its 
relatively high Gini (.372). The rate of old-age income inequality in the U.K. (.287) is 
moderately higher than the Canadian rate, but significantly lower than the U.S. one. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
While the Canadian retirement income system is structurally similar to the U.K. and 
U.S. systems, there are many differences in the levels and generosity (especially to lower 
income persons) of public pension benefits. Wolfson and Murphy (1994), for instance, 
show that while the average income of seniors is considerably higher in the U.S. 
compared to Canada, Canadian seniors receive a higher average and proportion of income  
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from public sources than U.S. seniors.  
 
More income from public sources in Canada is clearly explained by higher levels of 
public pension benefits, which includes the nearly-universal OAS pension benefit. By way 
of illustration, in 1988, the maximum public pension (in Canadian dollars) for married 
couples aged 65+ in the U.S. was about $19,300 (Wolfson and Murphy 1994), compared 
to approximately $21,500 in Canada (National Council of Welfare 1989). In addition, 
unlike the public pension system in the U.S. that is significantly tied to employment 
history (excluding the Supplemental Security Income program), only a part of public 
pension benefits in Canada (i.e., C/QPP) are based on pre-retirement earnings. Hence, the 
public pension system in Canada is particularly generous to those at or near the bottom of 
the income distribution. In fact, the minimum income received from public pension 
sources by the poorest segment of the elderly population (i.e., unattached individuals with 
little or no income from earnings-related public or private pensions or savings) was 
$3,000 higher in Canada compared to the U.S. in 1988 (Wolfson and Murphy 1994). 
 
Given that Canada has a more generous and progressive public pension system, which 
seniors rely quite extensively on, those in the lowest quintiles of the income distribution 
just prior to retirement tend to experience no drop in their income at age 65; as shown 
earlier, it actually increases. Their improved position relative to those at higher income 
levels contributes to a reduced rate of income inequality in old age. 
  
The reverse trend occurs in the U.S. Studies, using similar measures of economic well-
being as those used here, find that the level of income inequality within a cohort increases 
over the later stages of the life course. Pampel and Hardy (1994a) show that level of 
inequality in family income (measured by the Theil index) is more than twice as high at 
ages 70-74 compared to ages 45-49. Crystal and Waehrer (1996) and Crystal and Shea 
(1990a) show that the Gini coefficient of income inequality steadily increases within a 
cohort as it leaves the working years and enters the retirement years.  
  
These data suggest that any equalizing impact of government transfers in the U.S. is 
outweighed by the grossly skewed distributions of earnings and pension/investment 
income in later life. In fact, LIS data show that aggregate government transfers are only 
about 44% of gross total income of the 65+ population in the U.S., compared to 72% in 
Sweden and 54% in Canada.
20 In other words, for every $100 of income received by 
Swedish seniors, $72 comes from public pensions; while Canadian seniors receive $54 out 
of every $100 from public sources, U.S. seniors receive just $44. Moreover, while Social 
Security benefits are based on a somewhat progressive formula, low pensions are received 
by those with low pre-retirement earnings (Wolfson and Murphy 1994). The relatively 
high rate of old-age income inequality in the U.S. therefore stems from the importance 
placed on private pensions/investments and earnings (which are strongly tied to, for 
example, education, race, and gender (Crystal 1996; Crystal, Shea, and Krishnaswami 










Two opposing ideological viewpoints were, and still are, central to the development 
and revision of pension policy and programs (Guest 1997). First, the "residual" view holds 
that individuals, through private pension plans and personal investments, and their families 
should be responsible for providing for their old age. The role of the state is to be limited 
to the confines of the needy. This market-driven concept of residual welfare was 
important in shaping public pension policy and programs up to World War II. The 
opposing view holds that a commitment to collective responsibility, in the form of a 
comprehensive welfare state, is needed to ensure social and economic well-being. This 
"institutional" concept of welfare played a central role in molding the post-World War II 
welfare state. 
  
The residual concept is again playing a significant part in shaping today's old-age 
welfare states (Myles and Street 1995). Population aging, fiscal constraints, and 
generational equity are often sited by neo-conservatives as reasons for re-examining (i.e., 
reducing) commitment to collective responsibility for the aged. This laissez-faire ideology 
is a connecting thread running through most social policy reforms in industrial nations. 
Even Scandinavian countries, with highly developed and generous welfare states, have 
been influenced by right-wing thinking (Townson 1994). 
 
This study has demonstrated the importance of universal and high minimum-level 
public pension benefits for leveling old-age income inequality. Cohorts entering old age 
today in Canada experience a drop in the overall level of income inequality partly because 
of the relative importance placed on public pensions, which are distributed more equally 
than labour income. A few decades ago, when Canada's public pension system was just 
taking shape and earnings and other private income were the main sources of economic 
well-being for seniors, the level of income inequality likely did not drop at age 65. A 
reduction in the state's involvement in social security (i.e., returning social programs to a 
social assistance function for those most in need, while encouraging market place 
solutions for income security and maintenance) would likely lead to an increase in rates of 
poverty and income inequality among future generations of Canadian seniors.
22 A large 
role for the state in providing for seniors is therefore essential to maintaining economic 
well-being and stability among lower and middle class persons, and equalizing the 






Gini Coefficients of Family Income
 Inequality, 1973 to 1996: Family Heads born 
between 1922 and 1926 
 
                                                 Year                                                
  
  1973  1981  1986  1991  1996 
 
Age  47-51  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
  Gini
a  .321  .350  .385  .312  .303 
  Gini
b  .300  .317  .348  .254  .244 
  Gini
c  .297  .318  .360  .305  .286 
n  2,301  2,910  2,199  2,809  1,914 
 
a. Coefficients are based on after-tax family income (i.e., no adjustments were made to 
the data). 
b. Coefficients are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size only. 
c. Coefficients are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size and 
  underreporting of income components. 





Gini Coefficients of Adjusted
a Family Income
 Inequality, 1973 to 1996: Family Heads 
by Cohort, Year, and Age 
 
       Year      
Cohort  1973  1981  1986  1991  1996 
 
1917-1921 
Age  52-56  60-64  65-69  70-74  75-79 
  Gini  .319
  .354  .316  .308  .293 
1922-1926 
Age  47-51  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
  Gini  .297  .318  .360  .305  .286
 
1927-1931 
Age  42-46  50-54  55-59  60-64  65-69 
  Gini  .292  .306  .338  .364  .282 
 
a. Coefficients are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size and 
underreporting of income components. 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1973-1996, Economic Family files.   
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TABLE 3 
Percentage Distribution of Adjusted
a Family Income by Income Quintiles, 1973 to 
1996: Family Heads born between 1922 and 1926 
 
                                                 Year                                               
Quintile 1973  1981  1986  1991  1996 
 
Age  47-51  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
  Bottom     7.0%    6.8%    6.4%    9.7%  10.3% 
  Second  13.6  12.7  11.5  12.4  13.1 
  Middle 18.7  17.9  16.6  15.9  16.0 
  Fourth  24.2  24.3  23.3  21.7  21.6 
  Top  36.5
b  38.3  42.2  40.3  39.0 
 
a. Distributions are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size and 
underreporting of income components. 
b. May not total exactly to 100% due to rounding.  
 







a Median Family Income (in 1996 dollars)
b by Income Quintiles, 1973 to 
1996: Family Heads born between 1922 and 1926 
 
                                                 Year                                               
Quintile 1973  1981  1986  1991  1996 
 
Age  47-51  55-59  60-64  65-69  70-74 
  Bottom  $8,740           $10,298  $8,900           $12,363           $12,442 
  Second 16,172  17,785  14,582  15,205  15,445 
  Middle 21,770  24,874  21,485  19,479  18,680 
  Fourth 28,279  33,641  30,044  26,608  25,195  
  Top      38,730  47,925  46,373  41,834  39,111  
 
a. Medians are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size and 
underreporting of income components. 
b. Dollar figures were adjusted for inflation using Statistics Canada's Consumer Price 
Index. 
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1973-1996, Economic Family files.  
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TABLE 5 
Percentage Distribution of Adjusted
a Family Income within Top and Bottom Income 
Quintiles, by Source of Income, 1996: Family Heads born between 1922 and 1926 
 
                Quintile                                                         
Source   Bottom   Top   All Cases 
 
OAS/GIS
b   70.6% ($8,671)
c   9.8% ($5,542)  25.2% ($6,733) 
C/QPP
     19.0
    (2,332) 11.1   (6,280)  18.6   (4,976) 
Investment
          1.0
           (124) 33.9 (19,230)  20.0   (5,334) 
Private Pension
       2.6      (324) 26.7 (15,136)  21.8   (5,824) 
Earnings       0.4        (54) 14.6   (8,279)    9.1    (2,417) 
Other Income
d       6.4      (783)   4.1   (2,313)    5.3      (1,422) 
Total
e                       100.0 (12,288)         100.0 (56,780)          100.0 (26,706)
 
 
a. Distributions are based on before-tax family income adjusted for family size and 
underreporting of income components. 
b. Includes spousal and provincial income supplement programs, which aim to assist the 
poorest elderly. 
c. Mean incomes are in brackets. 
d. Other income is that from other government and private sources. 
e. May not total exactly to 100% due to rounding.  
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances, 1996, Economic Family files. 
 
TABLE 6 
Percentage Distribution of Adjusted
a Family Income by Income Quintiles and Gini 
Coefficients, for Selected Countries,
b Family Heads Aged 65+ 
 
                                 Country                                      
Quintile  Canada  U.S.  U.K.  Sweden 
  
  Bottom  11.7%    6.5%  10.1%  12.3%  
  Second  14.3  11.2  13.5  16.2  
  Middle  16.6  15.8  15.6  18.5  
  Fourth  21.6  22.6  21.0  21.1  
  Top   35.9
c  43.9  39.5  31.8  
Gini   .240  .372  .287  .191  
 
a. Distributions/coefficients are based on after-tax family income adjusted for family size. 
b. The following LIS datasets were used: Canada, 1994; U.S., 1994; U.K., 1995; and 
Sweden, 1995.  
c. May not total exactly to 100% due to rounding.  
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ENDNOTES 
 
1All individuals 65+ who meet a residence requirement automatically receive an OAS 
pension. However, higher income pensioners repay part or all of their benefit through a 
"claw-back" introduced in 1989. OAS pension payments start dropping when an 
individual's income tops around $55,000 and seniors with net incomes of about $85,000 
receive no OAS pension benefits. 
2Following most studies on economic well-being in later life, persons aged 65+ (the 
normal age of eligibility for retirement benefits) are used as a proxy for the retired 
population.  
3Because the SCF covers only private households, the aged are not as well represented as 
other age groups in this study (i.e., a higher percentage of them reside in institutions).  
4Given that the SCF is available from 1973 onward, this cohort is selected since it crosses 
both the middle and later stages of the life course. 
5It is possible to compare SCF data from different years since the sampling procedure 
used in all SCF surveys is the same. 
6It is important to point out that the same set of individuals is not examined at each point 
in time. Rather, the data at each point in time are based on a different random sample of 
individuals born between 1922 and 1926. Hence, snapshot data for one year at a time are 
essentially used as proxies for lifetime income statistics. This pseudo-panel data is a 
reasonable substitute for genuine panel data, and indeed may produce more reliable 
estimates than longitudinal data; that is, using a series of random samples from the same 
cohort eliminates the problems caused by attrition in real panels (Browning, Deaton, and 
Irish 1985).  
7Four countries are selected for analysis: Canada, United States, United Kingdom, and 
Sweden. Canada, U.S., and U.K. are chosen because they represent "liberal" welfare 
states where market income plays a large role in the economic well-being of the aged, 
while Sweden is the epitome of the "social democratic" model based on comprehensive, 
universalistic, and generous income maintenance programs (Esping-Andersen 1990).   
8Since there is more inequality in wealth than in income (Osberg 1981), and given the 
cumulative nature of wealth, the dispersion in the distribution of economic well-being 
over the life course would likely be greater with the inclusion of wealth in the analysis. 
However, using a combined annual cash income/wealth estimate of economic well-being, 
analysis of age groups from the 1984 SCF wealth survey reveals a similar pattern of 
changes in inequality rates over the later life course to those observed in this paper. 
Hence, annual money income can be used as a proxy of economic well-being with a 
relatively high level of confidence (i.e., in testing the three models of economic well-being 
and the life course). 
9While family income rather than personal income is a more appropriate measure, it is 
difficult to analyze the actual economic position of each individual within a family. 
Personal income data are therefore also used to separate individual income from the 
income of other family members, and to supplement the main family income findings. 
10A more inclusive approach would be to use the person as the unit of analysis, while  
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utilizing family income as the income measure. This approach (i.e., focusing on family 
income of persons) has the advantage of being more representative because it would 
include, for example, the aged living in non-elderly headed families (Crystal 1996). 
However, similar to other Canadian income datasets, the SCF only permits analysis of 
family income of family heads. 
11Prior to 1981 Statistics Canada made adjustments for non-response through weighting, 
and not imputation.  
12Another challenge to this research is age-specific socio-economic differences in 
mortality and morbidity. Since persons of lower income are more likely to die at earlier 
ages (Mustard et al. 1997), it is possible that longitudinal studies inflate income levels in 
later life. However, Prus (1998) finds that when compensating for the selective effects of 
mortality levels measures of economic well-being (i.e., income inequality), even in old 
age, do not dramatically change. Also, Henretta and Campbell (1976) find that after re-
weighting income data for the effects of education differences in mortality estimates of 
post-retirement income change very little. Therefore, the data here are not adjusted for 
age-specific socio-economic differences in mortality. 
13Like G, the CV satisfies all "desirable" conditions of a robust measure of inequality 
(Love and Wolfson 1976). 
14In a hypothetical, infinite population, a maximum G of one is possible. In a limited 
population, however, the maximum G is equal to N-1/N. 
15The Gini coefficients in each row in Table 1 are based on either unadjusted or adjusted 
income. The most noticeable change between income measures occurs after the data are 
adjusted for family size. For example, in 1991, when all cohort heads were at least 65+, 
the Gini index for the unadjusted distribution of family income is .312. However, after an 
adjustment is made for family size, this index falls to .254. The effect of adjusting for 
family size in old age is significant because many elderly-headed families (about 50%) 
consist of an unattached individual. Adjustments for underreporting of income also 
influence the Gini index, notably in old age. Looking again at the 1991 figures, the ratio 
increases from .254 (second row of Ginis) to .305 (third row). This increase is the result 
of the inflation of investment income, which is the largest source of income for the 
wealthiest seniors. Given that these adjustments have substantial effect on estimates of 
income inequality, the rest of the analysis is based on data adjusted for family size and 
underreporting.  
16To gauge the impact of gender and ethnicity/race on income inequality, separate 
inequality analyses for male- vs. female-family heads and Canadian-born vs. foreign-born 
family heads were done. Consistent with the findings in Table 1, the rate of income 
inequality decreases for all four groups in old age. Generally speaking, the results for both 
Canadian- and foreign-born cohorts are almost identical to the Gini ratios obtained for the 
entire cohort. There is, however, somewhat less income inequality among male-headed 
families compared to their female counterparts during the traditional working years (i.e., 
up to age 60), indicating that gender plays a role in the overall level of inequality. This 
would suggest that while some families headed by women are able to overcome income 
barriers, most are not. In old age, however, this trend is reversed; inequality is  
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considerably higher among male-headed families. This is largely because public pension 
programs, and not the labour market, become a key source of retirement income for 
female headed families, while disparities in private sources of income are more common 
among families headed by older men.   
17The validity of these findings is confirmed by coefficients of variation (CV). They 
indicate the same pattern in inequality from 1973 to 1996; that is, inequality increases up 
to age 64 then continues to fall in old age. For example, the CV, based on family income 
adjusted for family size and underreporting, decreases from .438 in 1986 (when cohort 
heads are aged 60-64) to .416 in 1991 (ages 65-69). The CV decreases even further to 
.393 in 1996. 
18The results of a cohort analysis with personal income for all individuals born between 
1922 and 1926 also mirrors these findings - there is a positive then negative association 
between level of income inequality from mid- to late-life. The Gini coefficients for 
adjusted (i.e., for underreporting) personal income between 1981 to 1996 (SCF personal 
income files are only available from 1981 onward) are: .349 in 1981 (i.e., for persons aged 
55-59), .385 in 1986 (60-64), .361 in 1991 (65-69), and .348 in 1996 (70-74). These 
figures are only for individuals who reported an income greater than zero in these years. 
The level of inequality in personal income is in fact considerably higher in 1981 and 1986 
when all cases are included because of the significant number of persons with no income 
(e.g., the chronically unemployed and married women not working in the paid labour 
force). 
19Adjustments to LIS income data for underreporting are not made because of the lack of 
independent aggregate estimates of income sources from some of the countries analyzed 
here; adjustments are made for family size by dividing total family income by the square 
root of family size. 
20Government transfers include basic old age benefits, supplementary old age benefits, and 
survivor's pensions. Total gross income is government transfers plus private pension and 
factor (earnings, dividends, interest, etc) income, before taxes.  
21It is important to note that besides a country's public pension policies, other factors, 
such as the taxation system, also influence the magnitude of income inequality among 
seniors (Myles 1981).  
22Indeed, Murphy and Wolfson (1991) show that over the next 50 years the OAS 
claw-back (see endnote 1) will result in more and more middle class persons slipping 
into poverty. Specifically, while all public pension programs are fully indexed to the 
cost of living, the OAS claw-back ceilings are not. Consequently, more and more 
seniors will be subject to the claw-back each year. The claw-back at first affects only 
seniors who are financially well-off, but in the future will extend to middle and lower 
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